

Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DLOS-04 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01

CEQ-01 CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00 DODE-00

DOTE-00 EB-07 EPA-01 ERDA-05 FEAE-00 FMC-01 TRSE-00

H-02 INR-07 INT-05 IO-11 JUSE-00 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05

NSF-01 OES-03 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15

USIA-06 SAL-01 AF-06 EUR-12 SAJ-01 MC-02 ARAE-00 /137 W

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P 121437Z MAR 76

FM AMEMBASSY NASSAU

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7941

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 NASSAU 0427

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PLOS, MOPS, EFIS, MARR, PFOR BF

SUBJ: TOUR D'HORIZON WITH MINISTER OF EXTERNAL AFFAIRS ADDERLEY,
THURSDAY, MARCH 11, 1976

REF: A) STATE 054588, B) STATE 049330, C) STATE 058805

1. IN A WIDE-RANGING DISCUSSION WITH MINEXTAFF ADDERLEY WHICH
LASTED 1 1/2 HOURS, SEVERAL ITEMS OF PARTICULAR INTEREST WERE
TOUCHED UPON.

2. LOS. I CONVEYED THE ESSENCE OF REF A TO ADDERLEY, ASKING
FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE PROBABLE OUTCOME. HE RESPONDED
THAT HE WAS VERY PESSIMISTIC. ASIDE FROM THE FACT THAT THE
ISSUES WERE COMPLICATED AND THE NUMBER OF NATIONS INVOLVED
IMPOSSIBLY LARGE, THE PROBLEM WAS MADE MORE DIFFICULT BY
VIRTUE OF THE FACT THAT SO FEW OF THE PARTICIPANTS HAVE THE
CULTURAL BACKGROUND OR THE INTELLECTUAL SOPHISTICATION NECESSARY
TO UNDERSTAND THE ISSUES. THE FACT THAT FAILURE TO REACH AN
LOS AGREEMENT WILL BE A FAR GREATER DISADVANTAGE TO THE
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SMALLER STATES THAN TO THE LARGE STATES IS PERFECTLY APPARENT,

BUT SIMPLY NOT COMPREHENDED NOR ACCEPTED. WITH REGARD TO THE LATTER, THE MINISTER MENTIONED THE U.S. 200 MILE LIMIT LEGISLATION AS A CASE IN POINT.

COMMENT: IT IS CLEAR THAT THE BAHAMAS WILL CONTINUE, AS IT HAS IN THE PAST, ESSENTIALLY TO SUPPORT POSITIONS TAKEN BY THE U.S. ADDERLEY'S OWN ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, IS THAT PROSPECT OF AN AGREEMENT BEING EVENTUALLY NEGOTIATED IS VERY SLIM.

3. CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA. ADDERLEY'S OWN VIEW IS THAT IT WAS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT THE RUSSIANS SUPPORTED THE MPLA. HE STATED CATEGORICALLY THAT HE DID NOT TRUST THE RUSSIANS AND EXRESSED CONSIDERABLE FAMILIARITY WITH SOVIET DOCTRINE RELATING TO SUPPORT FOR WARS OF NATIONAL LIBERATION. AT THE SAME TIME, HE QUESTIONED WHETHER THERE WAS THAT MUCH DOCTRINAL DIFFERENCE AMONGST THE THREE COMPETING ANGOLAN FACTIONS WHETHER ANY OF THEM, INCLUDING THE MPLA, WERE DOCTRINAIRE MARXISTS WHO WOULD LOOK TO MOSCOW FOR LEADERSHIP AND FINALLY WHETHER IN THE LAST ANALYSIS THE RUSSIANS WOULD NOT FIND THEMSELVES ON THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN. I REMINDED HIM THAT AFTER BATISTA'S OVERTHROW THERE WERE THOSE WHO SAID CASTRO WAS NOT A COMMUNIST AND I WONDERED HOW MUCH CONFIDENCE ONE COULD HAVE THAT THE COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT DOMINATE THE MPLA. HE SAID HE AGREED WITH MY COMMENTS AND WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE POSSIBILITY FOR CONTINUED EXERCISE OF COMMUNIST INFLUENCE WAS FACILITATED BY THE RACIALLY ORIENTED PRESSURES WHICH WILL BE GENERATED AGAINST RHODESIA. I SAID THAT OUR POSITION HAD BEEN THAT WE COULD ACCEPT ANY GOVERNMENT THAT THE THREE CONTENDING PARTIES AGREED TO. WHAT WE OPPOSED WAS THE IMPOSITION BY A MINORITY OF ITS VIEWS THROUGH RUSSIAN SUPPLIED ARMS AND CUBAN SOLDIERS. I ASKED WHETHER THERE WOULD NOT BE CONCERN IN THE CARIBBEAN OVER THIS PROJECTION OF CUBAN ARMS INTO AFRICA. ADDERLEY IMPLIED THAT IT OUGHT TO BE A MATTER OF CONCERN BUT HE DOUBTED THAT IT WOULD BE. THE LATIN AMERICAN CHARACTER OF THE CARIBBEAN STATES IS SIMPLY TOO UNSOPHISTICATED TO SEE AND UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THE THREAT.

ONCE AGAIN, ADDERLEY, WHO SEES HIMSELF AS AND WHO IN FACT IS, A HIGHLY EDUCATED, HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED WESTERN-ORIENTED STATESMAN, EXPRESSED HIS DISDAIN FOR THE LESS-LOGICAL AND AS CONFIDENTIAL

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HE VIEWS THEM, MORE EMOTIONAL, LATIN AMERICANS. SO FAR AS THE BAHAMAS ITSELF, I DOUBT THAT HE FEELS THAT THE CUBAN INVOLVEMENT IN ANGOLA POSES ANY MORE OF A THREAT THAN CUBA HAS EVER POSED TO THE BAHAMAS. IT IS A THREAT WHICH BAHAMIANS RECOGNIZE BUT BELIEVE IS NEWTRALIZED BY THE COUNTRY'S GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY TO THE U.S.

4. CUBAN FISHING RIGHTS. I ASKED ADDERLEY IF THERE HAD

BEEN ANY FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS WITH REGARD TO THE EXPRESSED CUBAN INTEREST IN REACHING AN AGREEMENT ON FISHING IN BAHAMIAN WATERS. HE SAID THERE HAD NOT BEEN. AS HE HAD PREVIOUSLY RELATED TO ME, THE CUBANS DID SEND OVER A MIDDLE-LEVEL DELEGATION SEVERAL WEEKS AGO AT THE TIME A NUMBER OF CUBAN LOBSTER BOATS WERE APPREHENDED BY BAHAMIAN MARINE POLICE FOR FISHING IN BAHAMIAN WATERS. OSTENSIBLY THE DELEGATION WAS TO DISCUSS THE RELEASE OF THE FISHERMEN AND BOATS, BUT IN FACT IT RAISED THE QUESTION OF NEGOTIATING AN AGREEMENT ON BOTH FIN AND LOBSTER FISHING. ADDERLEY SAID HE ASKED OUT OF CURIOSITY WHAT THEY HAD IN MIND AND WAS TOLD THAT THE CUBANS WOULD LIKE TO TAKE 20 MILLION POUNDS OF FIN FISH AND TWO MILLION POUNDS OF LOBSTER. ADDERLEY RESPONDED THAT THE CUBANS WANTED TO TAKE MORE FISH THAN EXISTED, TO WHICH THE CUBANS INDICATED THAT THEIR POSITION WAS NEGOTIABLE. ADDERLEY, IN TURN, RESPONDED THAT THERE WAS REALLY NOTHING TO NEGOTIATE AND MENTIONED TO THE CUBANS THAT HAVING JUST REJECTED AN AMERICAN PROPOSAL FOR AN AGREEMENT ON LOBSTERS, IT WAS THE HEIGHT OF UNREALITY FOR THE CUBANS TO BELIEVE THAT THE BAHAMAS WOULD OR COULD ENTER INTO AN AGREEMENT WITH CUBA. ADDERLEY STATED: "I ASKED THEM TO GET OFF MY BACK AND IN FACT THEY HAVE. I HAVE HEARD NOTHING FURTHER FROM THEM SINCE."

5. PUERTO RICO. CONSISTENT WITH REF B, I EXPRESSED OUR VIEWS ON THE PUERTO RICAN ISSUE AND ASKED ADDERLEY WHETHER HE THOUGHT IT WOULD COME UP AGAIN AND, IF SO, WITH WHAT RESULTS. HE SAID HE THOUGHT IT ALMOST CERTAIN THAT THE CUBANS WOULD RAISE IT AGAIN. MOREOVER, CONSISTENT WITH HIS VIEWS ON THE LACK OF SOPHISTICATION AND INDEED THE UTTER NAIVETE OF MOST OF THE CARIBBEAN STATES, HE THOUGHT IT WOULD PROBABLY RECEIVE CONSIDERABLE SUPPORT. AGAIN HE CONTRASTED THE BAHAMIAN AWARENESS OF "THE FACTS" BEARING ON THE MATTER, I.E. 99 PERCENT PUERTO RICAN VOTE IN FAVOR OF ASSOCIATION WITH THE U.S.,
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IN PART ATTRIBUTING THIS TO THE WESTERN EUROPEAN CULTURE OF THE BAHAMAS, PLUS THE EXTENSIVE AVAILABILITY OF WESTERN PRESS MEDIA TO EXPLAIN THE DIFFERENCE IN ATTITUDES. HE FURTHER

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ACTION ARA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DLOS-04 ACDA-05 AGR-05 AID-05 CEA-01

CEQ-01 CG-00 CIAE-00 CIEP-01 OFA-01 COME-00 DODE-00

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COMMENTED THAT ONE WOULD THINK WITH ALL OF THE INTERNAL PROBLEMS THAT THE CUBANS HAD THEY WOULD NOT GO ABOUT ATTEMPTING TO STIR UP EXTERNAL TROUBLES. I NOTED IN RESPONSE THAT, AS FAR BACK AS ARISTOTLE, PRECISELY THAT TECHNIQUE WAS ASSOCIATED WITH TOTALITARIAN STATES, I.E., WHEN IN DIFFICULTY AT HOME ENTER INTO FOREIGN DIVERSIONS.

6. U.S. FACILITIES. ADDERLEY COMMENTED THAT AFTER HE GOT BACK FROM THE UN HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH ME TO RENEW OUR NEGOTIATIONS ON THE U.S. FACILITIES. HE SAID THAT WE WOULD SHORTLY BE RECEIVING A LETTER EXTENDING THE TARGET FOR COMPLETION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO JUNE 30 SINCE IT WAS OBVIOUS WE WOULD NOT COMPLETE OUR DISCUSSIONS BY THE END OF MARCH. IN AN ENTIRELY JOCUAR VEIN, HE SAID THAT A RATHER AMUSING POINT HAD BEEN RAISED OVER OUR BASE PRESENCE IN A DISCUSSION WHICH GEORGE STEWART OF THE MINEXTAFF HAD HAD WITH AN ADMIRAL BALDOBA (SPELLING MAY BE WRONG) WHOM ADDERLEY DESCRIBED AS THE SOVIET LAW OF THE SEA EXPERT ON ARCHIPELAGOES. THE ADMIRAL (APPARENTLY A RETIRED SOVIET ADMIRAL) MENTIONED TO STEWART THAT HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THE BAHAMIANS MIGHT BE HAVING CONFIDENTIAL

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SOME DIFFICULTIES WITH THE AMERICANS ON REACHING A NEW AGREEMENT ON THEIR BASES IN THE BAHAMAS, IN WHICH CASE THE RUSSIANS WOULD BE HAPPY TO MOVE IN. I SAID THAT IN VIEW OF HIS EARLIER COMMENTS, I ASSUMED HE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO HAVE THE RUSSIANS MOVE IN.

COMMENT: WITH REGARD TO THIS LATTER POINT, I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT ADDERLEY FOR A MOMENT BELIEVED THAT THE RUSSIANS WERE BEING SERIOUS AND EVEN LESS SO THAT THE BAHAMIANS WOULD WISH TO HAVE THEM IN THE BAHAMAS. IN FACT HE WAS AMUSED BY THE INCONGRUITY OF THE IDEA. AT THE SAME TIME, HE COULDN'T RESIST OFFERING A SLIGHT NEEDLE. (IT SHOULD ALSO BE ADDED, HOWEVER, THAT MY ASSESSMENT OF GEORGE STEWART IS THAT HE HAS BEEN MILDLY HOSTILE TO U.S. INTERESTS AND, AS SUCH, AN EXCEPTION WITHIN THE MINEXTAFF. IT IS THUS NOT AT ALL IMPOSSIBLE THAT STEWART MIGHT HAVE ENCOURAGED HIS SOVIET COUNTERPART TO MAKE THE COMMENT BELIEVING THAT THIS WOULD SOMEHOW BE USEFUL IN EXERTING LEVERAGE IN OUR NEGOTIATIONS.) AS TO THE SUBSTANCE OF THE BAHAMIAN ATTITUDE TOWARD OUR FACILITIES OFFER, ADDERLEY GAVE NO INDICATION WHATSOEVER. HIS EXPLICIT REFERENCE TO THE FACT THAT HE WANTED TO REENGAGE ON THIS SUBJECT UPON HIS RETURN FROM NEW YORK MADE IT CLEAR THAT HE DID NOT WISH TO DO SO AT THIS TIME. SINCE ADDERLEY WOULD NOT SPEAK ON THIS ISSUE WITHOUT IT HAVING BEEN SUBJECTED TO CABINET DISCUSSION AND DECISION, IT IS FAIR TO ASSUME THAT SUCH DISCUSSION AND DECISION HAVE TAKEN PLACE. FROM ADDERLEY'S GENERAL ATTITUDE AS WELL AS BASED ON EMBASSY'S CONTINUING ASSESSMENT, WE BELIEVE THAT OUR OFFER IS NOT THAT FAR OFF THE MARK, THOUGH OBVIOUSLY THERE ARE ENOUGH QUESTIONS REQUIRING FURTHER DISCUSSION SO THAT AGREEMENT IS NOT FORESEEN BY END OF MARCH. I AM LUNCHING WITH RODNEY BAIN LATER TODAY AND MAY GAIN ADDITIONAL INSIGHTS AT THAT TIME.

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